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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Torts- Dog Owner's Statutory Liability in North Carolina
Homer Truitt, age five, was bitten by a dog in and about his
left eye. The attack occurred within the city limits of High Point,
Guilford County, North Carolina. Six months later, two claims for
damages were filed with the Board of County Commissioners of
Guilford County, one by the mother in behalf of Homer Truitt for
the dog bite injury, and one by the father for medical expenses he
had paid for the treatment of his son's injury.' The claims were
filed pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965)2 the relevant
portions of which are as follows:
The money arising under the provisions of this article [license
tax on dogs3 ] shall be applied to the school funds of the county
in which said tax is collected: Provided, it shall be the duty of
the county commissioners, upon complaint made to them of in-
jury to person or injury to or destruction of property by any
dog, upon satisfactory proof of such injury or destruction, to
appoint three free-holders to ascertain the amount of damages
done, including necessary treatment, if any, and all reasonable
expences incurred, and upon the coming in of the report of such
jury of the damage as aforesaid, the said county commissioners
shall order the same paid out of any moneys arising from the
tax on dogs as provided for in this article....4
'Record, p. 6, In re Truitt, 269 N.C. 249, 152 S.E.2d 74 (1967).
'The following amendments to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965) are
applicable to Guilford County: N.C. Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 547; N.C. Sess.
Laws 1945, ch. 138; N.C. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 143.
"Any person owning or keeping about him any . . . dog shall pay
annually a license or privilege tax. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-5 (1965).
This statute levying the dog tax has been upheld as constitutional on two
grounds. The first is that it is a privilege tax levied for a valid public
purpose, that purpose being to get rid of worthless dogs likely to be a
nuisance and to preserve only those valuable enough for their owners to
pay the tax on them. See McAlister v. Yancey County, 212 N.C. 208, 193
S.E. 141 (1937); Newell v. Green, 169 N.C. 462, 86 S.E. 291 (1915);
Mowery v. Town of Salisbury, 82 N.C. 175 (1880). The second is that it is
a valid police regulation to control and to regulate dogs. See Board of
Comm'rs v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 109 S.E. 77 (1921); Newell v. Green,
169 N.C. 462, 86 S.E. 291 (1915). Accord, City of Birmingham v. West, 236
Ala. 434, 183 So. 421 (1938); City of Dickinson v. Thress, 69 N.D. 748,
290 N.W. 653 (1940). See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R. 848 (1927).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965). [Emphasis added.] The statute is
similar to those of other states which impose a tax on dogs with the tax
revenues being used to compensate owners of livestock for injuries to the
livestock caused by dogs. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 22-355 (1958); ILL.
Rnv. STAT. ch. 8, § 15 (1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-324 (1964); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 140, § 161 (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 347.15
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The Board of Commissioners of Guilford County denied these
claims, but on appeal to the superior court, a judgment in favor of
both claimants was entered. The county's appeal to the Supreme
Court of North Carolina unsuccessfully attacked the constitutional-
ity of the statute under which the claimants sued.5 Unconstitution-
ality was asserted on the grounds that the statute: (1) authorizes
the payment of private claims out of dog-tax revenues in violation
of N.C. CoNsT. art. VII, § 6 (which prohibits counties from levy-
ing any tax for expenses other than necessary ones without a vote
of a majority of the electorate) ;6 and (2) contravenes N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 7 (which prohibits the granting of "exclusive or separate
emoluments or privileges"). 7
(1957); Mo. ANY. STAT. § 273.110 (1959); NED. REV. STAT. § 54-603
(1960); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 466:21 (1955); N.J. REv. STAT. § 4:19-4
(1959); ORio REv. CODE ANN. § 955.29 (1954); ORE. REV. STAT. § 609.170
(1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 488 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §
4-13-20 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 29-209 (1964); WASHr. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 16.08.010 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 174.11 (1957). These statutes are
generally upheld, not as taxes within the "public purpose" concept, but as
valid police regulations. E.g., Wisdom v. Board of Supervisors, 236 Iowa
669, 19 N.W.2d 602 (1945); Nichols v. Logan, 184 Ky. 711, 213 S.W. 181
(1919); Worcester County v. Ashworth, 160 Mass. 186, 35 N.E. 773
(1893); Van Horn v. People, 46 Mich. 183, 9 N.W. 246 (1881); Hofer v.
Carson, 102 Ore. 545, 203 Pac. 323 (1922); State v. Anderson, 144 Tenn.
564, 234 S.W. 768 (1921).
The taxing act having been held valid and its main objective being to
create a fund to pay damage caused by dogs, is not the purpose valid?
... Since the levy for the stated purpose has been declared valid and
not in contravention of the State Constitution, it seems clear the
validity extends to the expenditure of funds for the stated purpose.
Id. at 252, 152 S.E.2d at 76.
'The decisions heretofore rendered by the Court make the test of a
'necessary expense' the purpose for which the expense is to be in-
curred. If the purpose is the maintenance of the public peace or the
administration of justice; if it partakes of a governmental nature or
purports to be an exercise by the city of a portion of the State's dele-
gated sovereignty; if, in brief, it involves a necessary governmental
expense-in these cases the expense required to effect the purpose is
'necessary' within the meaning of Art. VII, sec. 7 [now sec. 6], and
the power to incur such expense is not dependent on the will of the
qualified voters.
Henderson v. City of Wilmington, 191 N.C. 269, 279, 132 S.E. 25, 30
(1926). The county in the principal case contended that the statute autho-
rizing the payment of claims combined with the levy of the dog tax consti-
tuted a levy of a tax to finance a non-necessary expense, that is, compensation
of private claims. Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-8. See also Brief for Appellees,
pp. 2-6.
'The Constitutional limitation contained in Art. I, sec. 7, has been
frequently invoked by this Court to strike down legislation conferring
special privileges not in consideration of public service. . . . But
11191967]
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Under the statute' involved in In re Truitt,9 a party injured by
a dog has a cause of action against the county for his damages; the
county, upon payment of these damages, then has a cause of action
against the dog's owner for reimbursement. This statute' presents
two distinct problems. The first, the constitutional question," has
been considered and answered many times by the North Carolina
Supreme Court,' as it was in the principal case.' 3 The second is
unrelated to the first and has never been answered by the court.
Undecided as yet is the question of what relationship, if any, this
statute bears to the common law liability of dog owners for injuries
inflicted by their dogs. This note will primarily be directed to this
question.1
4
In North Carolina, scienter is the basis of a dog owner's com-
mon law liability for injuries inflicted by his dog.'" Liability arises
where the motivation is for a public purpose and in the public interest,
and does not confer exclusive privilege, legislation has been upheld.
Brumley v. Baxter, 225 N.C. 691, 698, 36 S.E.2d 281, 286 (1945). See
Brief for Appellant, pp. 8-10; Brief for Appellees, pp. 7-8.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
0269 N.C. 249, 152 S.E.2d 74 (1967).
"oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
"Though legislative determination of what constitutes a public purpose
and a necessary expense is given great weight by the Court, the final de-
termination is for the Court. Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 259 N.C.
605, 131 S.E.2d 464 (1963); Dennis v. City of Raleigh, 253 N.C. 400, 116
S.E.2d 923 (1960); Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N.C. 283, 42 S.E.2d
209 (1947); Purser v. Ledbetter, 227 N.C. 1, 40 S.E.2d 702 (1946); Palmer
v. Haywood County, 212 N.C. 284, 193 S.E. 668 (1937); Starmount Co. v.
Hamilton Lakes, 205 N.C. 514, 171 S.E. 909 (1933).
1" The constitutional determination has been more by implication than
by direct holding on the precise issue of whether the expense is a necessary
one. White v. Commissioners, 217 N.C. 329, 7 S.E.2d 825 (1940); Mc-
Alister v. Yancey County, 212 N.C. 208, 193 S.E. 141 (1937); Board of
Comm'rs v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 109 S.E. 77 (1921); Newell v. Green,
169 N.C. 462, 86 S.E. 291 (1915).
" The answer given by the court to the constitutional challenge was
that the expenditure of county funds to pay these claims was for a valid
public purpose. In re Truitt, 269 N.C. 249, 152 S.E.2d 74 (1967).
" An analysis of the basis of the dog owner's responsibility under the
statute is based on the assumption that the dog owner can be found and
is capable of reimbursing the county for the amount of damages paid out
by it. The statute, however, does call for the county's payment of claims
even where no possibility of reimbursement is present, that is, where the
owner is unknown. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
1" See Sink v. Moore, 267 N.C. 344, 148 S.E.2d 265 (1966); Pegg v.
Gray, 240 N.C. 548, 82 S.E.2d 757 (1954); Hobson v. Holt, 233 N.C. 81,
62 S.E.2d 524 (1950); Plumides v. Smith, 222 N.C. 326, 22 S.E.2d 713
(1942); Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485, 17 S.E.2d 676 (1941); Rector v.
Southern Coal Co, 192 N.C. 804, 136 S.E. 113 (1926); State v. Smith, 156
N.C. 628, 72 S.E. 321 (1911).
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only if two essential factors are present :1 the animal that inflicts the
injury possesses a "vicious propensity,"' and the owner has actual
or constructive knowledge of such propensity.' When these two
prerequisites are established, the owner's liability is predicated on
his negligent failure to confine or restrain the dog. 9 But in many
jurisdictions negligence need not be shown, and the owner's liability
is based upon scienter alone,"0 on the theory that he is harboring a
6 Pegg v. Gray, 240 N.C. 548, 82 S.E.2d 757 (1954) ; Plumides v. Smith,
222 N.C. 326, 22 S.E.2d 713 (1942) ; Rector v. Southern Coal Co., 192 N.C.
804, 136 S.E. 113 (1926); 66 A.L.R.2d 916, 921-22 (1959). The complaint
of an injured party is fatally defective without allegation of both of these
factors. Sellers v. Morris, 233 N.C. 560, 64 S.E.2d 662 (1951).
17 The term "vicious propensity" ".... does not connote a mere play-
ful canine trickster. It connotes conduct 'producing or tending to
produce mischief or harm; injurious; deleterious; hurtful.' . . . On
the other hand, if the habit of the dog is one which is likely to cause
injury, it is immaterial that the dog was playing."
Sink v. Moore, 267 N.C. 344, 350, 148 S.E.2d 265, 269-70 (1966).
Accord, Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485, 17 S.E.2d 676 (1942).
"8 The dog is no longer entitled to one bite before the owner can be
charged with knowledge of the vicious propensity. "Under the modem view
trial courts undertake to judge [the owner's knowledge] of the vicious
propensities of animals by their behavior, although it may fall short of
actual injury." Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485, 489, 17 S.E.2d 676, 678
(1942). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 509, comment g (1938). Evidence of
the dog's reputation is generally admissible to establish knowledge on the
part of the dog owner of the vicious propensity, though it is inadmissible
as proof of the dog's vicious propensity. Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485,
17 S.E.2d 676 (1942).
"9 The test of liability under such an interpretation is ... whether
the owner should know from the dog's past conduct that he is likely,
if not restrained, to do an act from which a reasonable person, in the
position of the owner, could foresee that an injury to the person or
property of another would be likely to result."
Sink v. Moore, 267 N.C. 344, 350, 148 S.E.2d 265, 270 (1966); State v.
Smith, 156 N.C. 628, 72 S.E. 321 (1911). Accord, Williams v. Moray, 74
Ind. 25, 39 Am. Rep. 76 (1881); Brune v. DeBenedetty, 261 S.W. 930
(Mo. Ct. App. 1924); Moore v. McKay, 55 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Ct. App.
1933). Other than the negligence theory, tvo other interpretations of the
scienter action have been advanced. (1) The owner is harboring a nuisance
by keeping a vicious dog. Turner v. Shropshire, 285 Ky. 256, 147 S.W.2d
388 (1941); Tidal Oil Co. v. Forcum, 189 Okla. 268, 116 P.2d 572 (1941).
(2) The owner is strictly liable for keeping a vicious dog. Zarek v. Fred-
ericks, 138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943); Brewer v. Furtwangler, 171 Wash.
617, 18 P.2d 837 (1933); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 509 (1938); Annot., 66
A.L.R.2d 916, 922 (1959). North Carolina rejects the view that the owner's
knowledge of the vicious propensity creates strict liability, in favor of
coupling a higher standard of care, based on the owner's higher knowledge,
with the general rule that one having charge of an animal must exercise
ordinary care in keeping it restrained. Herndon v. Allen, 253 N.C. 271,
116 S.E.2d 728 (1960).
2 See notes 21 and 22 infra.
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nuisance" or that he is strictly liable. 2
The requirements for imposing liability on a dog owner in a
particular jurisdiction determine what defenses are available to the
dog owner.' Thus, in jurisdictions such as North Carolina where
the scienter action depends on the owner's negligence in failing to
restrain the dog, the injured party's contributory negligence pre-
cludes his recovery?4 However, in jurisdictions that impose liability
for keeping a vicious dog without proof of negligence in the man-
ner of keeping it,25 contributory negligence is not available as a de-
fense to the dog owner.2 Yet courts of these jurisdictions are re-
luctant to deprive the dog owner of all defenses, and they tradition-
ally bar recovery if plaintiff's conduct amounts to voluntary assump-
tion of the risk 7 or intentional provocation of the dog's attack.28
An examination of the statute29 involved in In re Truitt ° may
be helpful before an attempt is made to ascertain what relationship,
" Turner v. Shropshire, 285 Ky. 256, 147 S.W.2d 388 (1941); Tidal Oil
Co. v. Forcum, 189 Okla. 268, 116 P.2d 572 (1941).
"Zarek v. Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943); Brewer v. Furt-
wangler, 171 Wash. 617, 18 P.2d 837 (1933).
" See Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 916 (1959).
"
4A bare majority of jurisdictions take this position. E.g., Frederickson
v. Kepner, 82 Cal. App. 2d 905, 187 P.2d 800 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947);
Swerdfeger v. Krueger, 145 Colo. 180, 358 P.2d 479 (1960); Ryan v.
Marren, 216 Mass. 556, 104 N.E. 353 (1914). Though in Hill v. Moseley,
220 N.C. 485, 17 S.E.2d 676 (1942), the court expressed some doubt as to
whether knowledge of a dog's vicious propensity creates strict liability, the
strict liability theory was rejected and contributory negligence was accepted
as a defense by Hobson v. Holt, 233 N.C. 81, 62 S.E.2d 524 (1950).
25 See note 24 supra.
20 Burke v. Fischer, 298 Ky. 157, 182 S.W.2d 638 (1944) ; Tidal Oil Co.
v. Forcum, 189 Okla. 268, 116 P.2d 572 (1941); Brewer v. Furtwangler,
171 Wash. 617, 18 P.2d 837 (1933).
"'Burke v. Fischer, 298 Ky. 157, 182 S.W.2d 638 (1944); Corley v.
Hubbard, 129 Neb. 38, 260 N.W. 551 (1935); Silber v. Seidler, 19 Misc. 2d
516, 188 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Brown v. Barber, 26 Tenn. App.
534, 174 S.W.2d 298 (1943); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 515 (1938). The
availability of the assumption of risk defense to the dog owner is limited
by the rule that a plaintiff does not assume the risk of defendant's negli-
gence. Brune v. DeBenedetty, 261 S.W. 930 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924).
8 Such a defense is applicable where plaintiff knows of the vicious pro-
pensity of a dog and wantonly excites it or unnecessarily puts himself in
the way of the animal so that he brings the injury on himself. Muller v.
McKesson, 73 N.Y. 195, 29 Am. Rep. 123 (1878). Accord, Klatz v. Pfeffer,
333 Ill. 90, 164 N.E. 224 (1928); Tidal Oil Co. v. Forcum, 189 Okla. 268,
116 P.2d 572 (1941); Brown v. Barber, 26 Tenn. App. 534, 174 S.W.2d
298 (1943); Moore v. McKay, 55 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Ct. App. 1933).
20 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
00269 N.C. 249, 152 S.E.2d 74 (1967).
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if any, it has to the foregoing common law principles. The statute 1
provides that upon complaint made to the county commissioners of
personal injury32 by any dog and upon satisfactory proof of the
injury, the injured party is entitled to recover damages from the
county commissioners for injuries sustained. The county commis-
sioners are then entitled to sue the owner of the dog, if he can be
found, and upon proof of payment of the injured party's claim by
the county, the owner must reimburse the county. 3 Aside from the
circuitous method by which the dog owner's liability is determined,
the statute on its face differs from the common law in three respects.
First, the scienter requirement is not mentioned by the statute; ap-
parently, it is unnecessary for the county to prove the owner knew
or had reason to know of the dog's vicious propensity in order to
hold the owner liable. Second, there is nothing in the statute indi-
cating that an inquiry into the nature of the conduct of the injured
party would be relevant, either by the county commissioners or by
the dog's owner; in other words, the statute on its face preserves no
common law defenses. Third, it is possible that the injured party is
given by this statute an absolute right to recover his damages, and
the dog's owner is placed under an absolute obligation to reimburse
the county. The obvious question posed is whether or not these
differences signify a legislative intent to abrogate, by statute, the
common law principles of liability and to create an entirely new basis
of liability and recovery.
A possible interpretation of the statute34 is that it indicates a
legislative intent to ease the burden of proof of the injured party
and to provide him with a ready and speedy recovery, rather than
an intent to change the negligence basis of liability. This interpreta-
tion is achieved by emphasizing the absence of a scienter require-
ment in the statute and the fact that the recovery is available from
the county. By suing under the statute, an injured party is relieved
of both the delay and expense involved in a suit under the common
law. As soon as he is able to prove a valid claim, he can recover
his damages from the county, thus leaving the burden on the county
to find the dog's owner and to make him pay. The position that the
"
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
" The statute also applies to "injury to or destruction of property by
any dog.... ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965).
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absence of a scienter requirement manifests legislative intent to ease
the claimant's burden of proof is consistent with the wide-spread
legislative erosion of unduly restrictive common law recovery
theories. "" Many states have enacted so-called "dog bite" statutes that
eliminate the necessity of the injured party's proving scienter on the
part of the dog's owner.3 6 The purpose of abolishing the scienter
requirement in these statutes was not to heighten the responsibility
of the dog owner, that is, to change the basis of common law
liability, but merely to abolish the common law scienter requirement
that frequently imposed on the claimant a burden of proof unduly
restricting recovery. T
Aside from the fact these statutes ease the burden of proof by
abolishing the scienter requirement, some of them, like the North
Carolina statute, do not expressly provide for retention of any of
the common law defenses ;"' others limit the defenses available to in-
tentional provocation of the dog by the injured party,39 or the in-
jured party's tortious conduct,4°or both.41 Yet even in suits under
"5 See notes 36 and 37 infra. See generally 1960 DuxE L.J. 146 (1960).
" ALA. CODE tit. 3, § 102 (1960); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-521
(1956); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3342; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 22.357 (1958);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 767.04 (1964); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8, § 12d (1966); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 16-214 (1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 351-28 (1949); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 155 (1965); Mica. STAT. ANN. § 12.544
(1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 347.22 (1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-
409 (1955); NEB. REV. STAT. § 54-601 (1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
466:19 (1955); N.J. R1v. STAT. ANN. § 4:19-16 (1959); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 955.28 (1954); Ox"a STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 42.1 (1964); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 4-13-16 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-101 (1964);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 18-1-1 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 16.08.040
(1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-20-13 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 174.02
(1957). Alabama, however, allows the owner to plead in mitigation of
damages his lack of scienter of the vicious propensity of the dog. ALA.
CODE tit. 3, § 103 (1960).
"' Ellsworth v. Elite Dry Cleaners, 127 Cal. App. 2d 479, 274 P.2d 17
(Dist. Ct App. 1954); Vandecar v. David, 96 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1957); Wojewoda v. Rybarczyk, 246 Mich. 641, 225 N.W. 555 (1929);
Foy v. Dayko, 82 N.J. Super. 8, 196 A.2d 535 (1964) ; Nelson v. Hansen, 10
Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W.2d 251 (1960).
"a CAL. CIV. CODE § 3342; NEB. REv. STAT. § 54-601 (1960); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 4-13-16 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-101 (1964); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 18-1-1 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-20-13 (1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 174.02 (1957).
"9ALA. CODE tit. 3, § 102 (1960); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-523
(1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 767.04 (1964); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 8, § 12d
(1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-214 (1964); Mica. STAT. ANN. § 12.544(1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 347.22 (1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§ 17-409 (1955).
'IOWA CODE ANN. § 351.28 (1949); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 466:20
(1955); N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:19-16 (1959).
'" CONN. GEN. STAT. Rv. § 22-357 (1958); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
[Vol. 451124
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these statutes with limited or no defenses, courts indicate a decided
reluctance to hold the dog's owner liable when the injured party is
guilty of intentional fault.' The common law inquiry into the na-
ture of the injured party's conduct remains intact, at least to the
extent of assumption of the risk and intentional provocation of the
dog.
43
Thus the differences between the common law and the North
Carolina statute do not necessarily warrant the interpretation that
a new basis of liability is created by the statute. Assuming that the
statute does not change the North Carolina negligence theory of
recovery, the significance of the differences between the common law
140, § 155 (1965); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 955.28 (1954); OICLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 4, § 42.1 (1964).
42 Under a statute which did not expressly provide for retention of any
common law defenses, the California Court stated:
We entertain no doubt that in adopting the Statute here in question
the Legislature did not intend to make the liability of the owner abso-
lute and render inoperative certain principles of law such as assump-
tion of risk or wilfully inviting injury. . . . While the Dog Bite
Statute does not found the liability on negligence, good morals and
sound reasoning dictate that if a person lawfully upon the portion of
another's property where the biting occurred should kick, tease, or
otherwise provoke the dog, the law should and would recognize the
defense that the injured person by his conduct invited injury and
therefore, assumed the risk thereof....
Smythe v. Schacht, 93 Cal. App. 2d 315, 209 P.2d 114, 118 (Dist. Ct. App.
1949). Accord, Ellsworth v. Elite Dry Cleaners, 127 Cal. App. 2d 479, 274
P.2d 17 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Kowal v. Archibald, 148 Conn. 125, 167
A.2d 859 (1961); Josephson v. Sweet, 173 So. 2d 463 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Vandecar v. David, 96 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957);
Koller v. Duggan, 346 Mass. 270, 191 N.E.2d 475 (1963); Wojewoda v.
Rybarczyk, 246 Mich. 641, 225 N.W. 555 (1929); Lavalle v. Kaupp, 240
Minn. 360, 61 N.W.2d 228 (1953); Gagnon v. Frank, 83 N.H. 122, 139
Atl. 373 (1927); Colby v. Lee, 83 N.H. 303, 142 Atl. 115 (1928); Foy v.
Dayko, 82 N.J. Super. 8, 196 A.2d 535 (1964); Peck v. Williams, 24 R.I.
583, 54 Atl. 381 (1903); Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W.2d
251 (1960); Schraeder v. Koopman, 190 Wis. 459, 209 N.W. 714 (1926);
Legault v. Malacker, 166 Wis. 58, 163 N.W. 476 (1917).
Some jurisdictions, however, require that the fault of the injured party
must amount to assumption of risk or intentional provocation of the dog,
and not just contributory negligence, before his conduct will bar his re-
covery. Doerfler v. Redding, 2 Conn. Cir. 694, 205 A.2d 502 (Cir. Ct. App.
(1964); Duell v. Coyle, 22 Conn. Supp. 332, 171 A.2d 427 (Super. Ct.
1961); Knapp v. Ball, 175 So. 2d 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Miles v.
Schrunk, 139 Iowa 563, 117 N.W. 971 (1908); Siegfried v. Everhart, 55
Ohio App. 351, 9 N.E.2d 891 (1936); McCarthy v. Daunis, 167 Atl. 918
(Conn. Sup. Ct. Err. 1933).
,' Quaere whether there is any significance in the fact that in the princi-
pal case counsel for the county was allowed without objection to question
the brother of the injured party with respect to the conduct of the children
around the dog immediately before the injury took place. See Record, p. 26.
11251967]
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and the statute can be interpreted as follows: the lack of the scienter
requirement in the statute means that the injured party has an easier
burden of proof ;44 the lack of any express retention of common
law defenses means that all defenses4" not expressly abolished by
the statute are retained;46 and the fact the injured party can sue
the county means he can recover his damages quickly. The county's
obligation to pay the injured party's claim and to sue the owner of
the dog would then seem to be based on subrogation principles; only
where the injured party has a valid claim and the owner has no
valid defense would the county pay the claim and seek reimburse-
ment.47
On the other hand, by concentrating solely on the language in
which the dog owner's liability is phrased in the statute, the con-
clusion may also be drawn that the legislature did intend to change
the underlying basis of the dog owner's responsibility to that of
strict liability. The statute plainly provides that the injured party
who can prove his damages shall be compensated for that amount ;48
similarly, the owner of the dog ". . . shall reimburse the county to
the amount paid out [by the county to the injured party] for such
injury. . .. '4" Nowhere in the statute is there express recognition
that any of the common law defenses would be applicable in a suit
under the statute. Such absolute phraseology is characteristic of
"See notes 36 and 37 supra and accompanying text.
"That is, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and intentional
provocation of the dog.
" See note 42 supra, and especially Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107,
102 N.W.2d 251 (1961). So much of the common law as has not been abro-
gated or repealed by statute is in full force and effect in North Carolina.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1953).
"" "Legal subrogation . . . is a device adopted by equity to compel the
ultimate discharge of an obligation by him who in good conscience ought to
pay it. It arises when one person has been compelled to pay a debt which
ought to have been paid by another and for which the other was primarily
liable." Beam v. Wright, 224 N.C. 677, 683, 32 S.E.2d 213, 218 (1944). The
chance that an injured party could be compensated by the county for a
claim to which the dog owner has a valid defense (which would only be
raised later, in the county's suit against the dog owner) could be eliminated
by joining the dog owner in the proceeding by the injured party against
the county.
""Upon proof of the amount of damages done, "the said county com-
missioners shall order the same paid out of any moneys arising from the tax
on dogs.... ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965). Mandamus lies to compel
the county to consider an injured party's claim. White v. Commissioners,
217 N.C. 329, 7 S.E.2d 825 (1940).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-13 (1965). [Emphasis added.]
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many "dog bite" statutes ;50 yet the courts, excepting only those of
Ohio,5'1 consistently refuse to hold the dog owner liable under these
statutes if the injured party's conduct amounts to assumption of the
risk or to intentional provocation of the dog,52 and in some cases, if
the conduct amounts to contributory negligence. 53 Whether or not
the North Carolina court would follow these states and read de-
fenses into the North Carolina statute is speculative. But the North
Carolina court has indicated, in at least one case,54 that the only
relevant questions in suits under the statute are first, is the defen-
dant (in the county's suit against the dog owner) the owner of the
dog, and second, is the damages award to the injured party reason-
able in amount.55 If this is the extent of the inquiry, then upon
"0 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3342; NEB. REv. STAT. § 54-601 (1960); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 4-13-16 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-101 (1964); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 18-1-1 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-20-13 (1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 174.02 (1957).
" Inasmuch as contributory negligence of plaintiff, as a defense to an
action, presupposes the existence of negligence upon the part of de-
fendant, and inasmuch as the liability of the owner or harborer of a
dog to one proximately injured by such dog is predicated solely upon
the statute... and not upon the negligence of the owner or harborer
of such dog, contributory negligence of plaintiff, as such, is not a de-
fense to an action for damages brought under the statute for in-juries proximately caused by such dog.
Siegfried v. Everhart, 55 Ohio App. 351, 9 N.E.2d 891, 891 (1936).
Dragonette v. Brandes, 135 Ohio St. 223, 20 N.E.2d 367 (1939).
2 The comment of the California Court is typical: "In adopting section
3342 of the Civil Code, the Legislature did not intend to render inapplicable
such defenses as assumption of risk or wilfully invited injury. Therefore,
those defenses are available in all proper cases." Gomes v. Byrne, 51 Cal.
2d 418, 333 P.2d 754, 755 (Sup. Ct 1959). See, e.g., Vandecar v. David,
96 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Foy v. Dayko, 82 N.J. Super. 8,
196 A.2d 535 (1964); Nelson v. Hansen, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W.2d 251
(1960).
"' See, e.g., Colby v. Lee, 83 N.H. 303, 142 AtI. 115 (1928); Foy v.
Dayko, 82 N.J. Super. 8, 196 A.2d 535 (1964); Schraeder v. Koopman, 190
Wis. 459, 209 N.W. 714 (1926).
"'Board of Comm'rs v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 109 S.E. 77 (1921).
"
5In a suit by the county commissioners against the dog owner, the
dog owner unsuccessfully contended that the statute denied him his right
to trial by jury. In holding the owner was not so deprived, the court stated:
Upon the trial [in the county's suit against the dog owner] it would
be incumbent upon the commissioners to show by the preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant was the owner of the dog, as well
as the amount of damage; and it would be open to the defendant to
rely upon failure of the plaintiff's proof and, if necessary, upon evi-
dence offered in rebuttal.
Board of Comm'rs v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 418, 109 S.E. 77, 78-79 (1921).
Presumably, the "evidence offered in rebuttal" can only be in rebuttal to
the fact of ownership and to the amount of damage.
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proof of the ownership of the dog and of the reasonableness of the
amount of the damages, the dog owner's obligation to reimburse the
county becomes absolute. No defense he could raise at common
law against the injured party could bar recovery against him in a
suit by the county. Similarly, in the injured party's suit against
the county, the county would be totally unconcerned with whether or
not the conduct of the injured party amounted to contributory negli-
gence, assumption of the risk, or intentional provocation of the dog.
Thus it seems that an injured party, unable to recover at common law
because he assumed the risk or intentionally provoked the attack,
would always elect56 to sue under the statute in order to be compen-
sated for his injuries. In turn the county would sue the dog owner
who is now placed in the position of an insurer for the conduct of
his dog, but only because the injured party elected to sue under the
statute instead of the common law. Thus the statute becomes an
avenue for the payment of claims uncompensable by common law
standards and for the imposition of liability on the dog owner where
the injured party voluntarily incurred his injury. Yet by interpret-
ing the statute literally, no conclusion can be reached other than
that it creates absolute liability.57
Therefore, because the counties to which the statute applies will
continue to be called upon to pay claims of injured parties, and be-
cause the basis of liability of the dog owner is susceptible to con-
flicting interpretations, legislative or judicial clarification of exactly
what was intended by the statute would seem to be in order. Al-
though both interpretations advanced for the basis of liability of the
dog owner result in the dog tax fund's being reimbursed for every
claim paid out by the county (except where the dog owner cannot
be found or where he is judgment-proof), the first interpretation,
that the statute does not create strict liability, unlike the second,
would not require the county to compensate the claims of parties
voluntarily incurring their injuries. Arguably, the public purpose of
such a statute would be more consistently served under the first
" Board of Comm'rs v. George, 182 N.C. 414, 109 S.E. 77 (1921), indi-
cates that an injured party can elect to sue either at common law or under
the statute.
' " 'Where the language of a statute or ordinance is clear and its mean-
ing unmistakable, there is no room for construction, but we merely follow
.the intention as thus plainly expressed.'" Perrell v. Beaty Service Co., 248
N.C. 153, 160, 102 S.E.2d 785, 790 (1958). Accord, Siegfried v. Everhart,
55 Ohio App. 351, 9 N.E.2d 891 (1936).
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interpretation, as parties would not be allowed to profit at public and
private expense from their own intentional acts. A definitive de-
termination of the uncertainties58 now existing in the statute would
allow more effective administration of the statute, would give the
dog owner more adequate notice of the degree of responsibility
placed on him by the statute, and would enable the county, because
the basis of the dog owner's liability is made clear, to defend and
prosecute more effectively suits under the statute.
SUSAN H. EHRINGHAUS
Torts-Rights of Servicemen under Federal Torts Claim Act
Of the enumerated exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act,'
none have created more litigation than the judicially imposed bar
to members of the armed forces prohibiting their suits against the
United States for injuries incurred incident to service. Since 1950
when the Supreme Court handed down the decision in Feres v.
United States,2 the courts have dogmatically rejected such suits by
servicemen.' With some degree of boldness, Judge Gray in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
denied the government's motion to dismiss an action admittedly fall-
ing within the prohibition enunciated in Feres, i.e., actions "for in-
juries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service."'4 In this case, Lee v. United
States,5 Judge Gray reasoned that by its decisions in a series of re-
cent cases the Supreme Court has vitiated its grounds for precluding
actions by servicemen for injuries incident to service wherein the
" There are procedural uncertainties in the statute as well as substantive
ones. The statute is silent on what would happen should the dog tax fund
be insufficient to discharge all the claims coming before the county, as well
as on the point in time at which the dog tax fund, after payment of claims,
is released to the schools.
128 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1964).
2340 U.S. 135 (1950).
'E.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964)
cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) (servicemen travelling in line of duty
on airline which collided with Air Force jet fighter); Buer v. United States,
241 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1956) (serviceman injured by negligence of army
surgeon while in "sick in hospital" status); Kilduff v. United States, 248
F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Va. 1960) (serviceman's injury based on government's
negligent failure to disclose results of physical examination).
'340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
'261 F. Supp. 252 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
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